baseball – Coffee Spoons

Revisiting My 2025 Red Sox Predictions

Back in March I posted my predictions for the 2025 Boston Red Sox on my social media feeds. I chose not to post it here, because the images had no real data visualisation and the only real information graphic was my prediction of the playoffs via a bracket. I did, however, write about how the Sox may have found their second baseman of the future in Kristian Campbell.

That prediction looks not so hot. The Sox optioned/demoted Campbell to the minor leagues in June and he has not been seen in Boston since. I still think the kid has long-term potential with his bat, but his globe worries me. It never really came around as I hoped.

But what about all my other predictions for the 2025 Red Sox and baseball more broadly?

Well, since today is Day One of the Postseason, I have nothing to report other than that my prediction of a Red Sox–Phillies World Series wherein Boston wins remains possible. Though the bracket itself, not so much. And as for the awards, we still have to wait and see on those too. The rest of the graphics, which had my predictions for select players and statistics, well, those we can look at here today.

We can start with the divisional standings.

The AL East turned out pretty differently than I thought it would. Baltimore’s young prospects did not have a great year and their rotation was even worse than I thought it would be—and that was not very good, I just thought their young bats would make up the difference.

Similarly, I thought the Yankees would fail to survive some bad injuries to start the year. Unfortunately they did and they host the Red Sox this evening in the Wild Card series.

Toronto finally put it all together after years of failing to do so and Tampa Bay did the opposite, had a bad year where everything fell apart after years of finding a way to put it all together.

In the NL East, the Braves just got hurt and never recovered. But that they were worse than even the Marlins in Miami surprised me. Without Atlanta atop the division, the Phillies and Mets made sense and in that micro-ranking I was spot on.

The West Coast divisions were similarly jumbled. I really thought Texas would dominate, but injuries and poor performances crippled their year. I had thought Houston lost too many big pieces from their roster to remain competitive. And in that I was largely correct as they sputtered out in the final week. As for the Angels and Athletics, the less said about them the better.

The NL West largely went as I expected. The Dodgers did not really dominate the way I and many others expected them to, but they performed well enough to win the division. I thought Arizona, San Diego, and San Francisco would slug it out all year and they largely did, though San Francisco was a bit more disappointing than I thought. And the Rockies were just bad.

As for the two central divisions, what can I say? No notes.

Ultimately I thought Boston would be a better than they were at year’s end. Though they dealt with serious injuries all year and the kids were forced to come up and reinforce the roster a bit too soon then they too all got hurt.

So let us start with the hitters.

The big, glaring, obvious point here is that in the middle of the season, the Boston Red Sox traded away their best player, at least their best hitter, in Rafael Devers. I thought then it was a stupid move. I think now it was a stupid move. In a few years, if I were a betting man, I would bet I still think it a stupid move. Boy did they really miss his bat in this lineup, especially when Roman Anthony, one of the aforementioned kids, went down with a month and a half left to play in the season.

Triston Casas fully ruptured his patellar tendon before he even played 30 games when I and many others counted on him to be our slugging first baseman. Instead of 35 home runs, he hit only 3.

Alex Bregman was hurt for about two months and Trevor Story was ice cold for about the same. Campbell was demoted like I said and Roman Anthony’s callup was later than I thought it would be and then he got hurt. Only Duran really performed as I expected.

The team also started the year running and being aggressive on the base paths, but that stopped during the summer. David Hamilton had an awful season and through the middle months was playing in AAA, only returning to the major league club because of the injuries ripping through Boston’s roster.

As for the two rookies I thought would play. most of the year, Campbell’s triple slash fell short of my predictions. Hence his demotion. Roman Anthony’s bat exceeded my expectations, though he was hitting more grounders and ground ball singles than I would have hoped, leading to a lower slugging percentage.

Finally we have the pitching.

Good lord did things go horribly awry.

Houck was bad then blew out his elbow and had Tommy John surgery, meaning he missed 2/3 of this season and will miss all of next year.

I never wanted Buehler, but thought he would be even more serviceable than he turned out to be. He was just awful. Of the expected rotation, that left just three guys: Garrett Crochet, Brayan Bello, and Lucas Giolito.

Crochet was as advertised, a true ace. He led the American League in innings pitched and all of baseball in strikeouts. He dominated. Period. Bello started the year injured as did Giolito, so whislt Bello did eventually hit the innings I expected him to, Giolito did not. Nor did either player reach the strikeout totals I thought they would, though with Bello that may be more due to a change in approach. It seemed as if last year the Sox wanted him to be a strikeout guy. He has shown flashes of it in the past. But this year he really seemed to buy into the ground ball and weak contact guy.

Then in the bullpen and in the ninth inning Aroldis Chapman was just as dominant as Crochet was at the start. Unfortunately, Justin Slaten had some elbow issues with some kind of a bone spur and he missed significant time. Though in his limited innings he looked as dominant as I hoped. Fortunately he just came back in time for the playoffs.

All in all, a good year for the Red Sox.

As for what happens next, well this time I will leave you with my playoff predictions, though I have edited them to actually include the teams that really did make them.

Let’s go Red Sox.

Credit for the pieces is mine.

MLB’s Realignment

Last weekend, Major League Baseball Commissioner Rob Manfred created a mild furore when he discussed the sport’s looming expansion and how it would likely prompt a geographic realignment. I am old enough I still recall baseball’s two leagues—the American and National—organised into only two divisions—East and West. In the early 1990s, baseball expanded and created a new Central Division. Afterwards, teams changed divisions, teams changed leagues, the sport expanded again to add new teams. As of today, MLB comprises 30 teams, 15 each in each league divided five teams per division. The only potential downside is whereas for decades the leagues only played amongst themselves, since the late 1990s, the odd numbers of teams have required “interleague” play on a daily basis.

But baseball wants to expand to 32 teams in a process yet to begin. Expansion requires the interested parties to pay an enormous fee, making other owners significant amounts of sweet, sweet cash. The question on everyone’s mind is where will the two expansion teams locate? And once they start play, how will the sport organise its teams?

The Athletic posted an article about this very issue earlier this week and it included two nice and simple maps showing one potential geographic realignment. This image is of author Stephen J. Nesbitt’s idea for the American League. (I care about the American League because as my regular readers by now know, I am an unapologetic fan of the Red Sox.)

As maps go, I think it works well. Personally, I prefer lighter backgrounds to darker, but a grey map is a grey map all the same. I think the colours work well and visually group the proposed divisions clearly. The white box makes clear the new division. (The map for the National League also works well.)

Beyond the information design or data visualisation level, I generally like the realignment proposed here as it offers a decent compromise between those wanting a basketball-style apportionment into two conferences, one eastern and one western, and those traditionalists like myself who still value the distinction between the American and National Leagues.

The biggest issue is where will the teams be? The author assumes one team on the East Coast or at least east of the Mississippi, and one West Coast or west of the Rocky Mountains. But baseball returning to Canada and Montreal would be welcome as would an expansion team in Texas, say Austin or San Antonio. Then of course you have the issue of Oakland. And the longshots have always been expansion into Mexico.

Personally, I have long been in favour of an even larger expansion to 36 teams. For sake of argument: Portland, Salt Lake City, San Antonio, Charlotte, Nashville, and Montreal have always made sense to me. Of course six new teams in one quick go would be impractical and thus it would be a long-term goal. But three 6-team divisions would mean 18 teams per league and you could still eliminate or reduce interleague play to special occasion weekends.

Credit for the piece goes to Drew Jordan.

Bring on the Beantown Boys

For my longtime readers, you know that despite living in both Chicago and now Philadelphia, I am and have been since way back in 1999, a Boston Red Sox fan. And this week, the Carmine Hose make their biennial visit down I-95 to South Philadelphia.

And I will be there in person to watch.

This is the second series after the All-Star break and as much as I wish it were otherwise, the Red Sox are just not as good as the Phillies. The team my hometown supports is just better than the one for whom I root. The Sox are 54-47 with a .535 winning percentage and the Phillies are 56-43 with a .566 winning percentage. The Phillies have the better rotation, by far. And the Red Sox’ two best pitchers just threw out in Chicago whereas the Phillies’ best toe the rubber over the next three nights.

But…the Boston baseball bats are a bit better and the Bank is a bandbox. Consequently I do not want to say the Phillies sweep the Sox, but my prediction is it will be tough for the Sox.

How does this connect to information design and data visualisation? Last week as the “second half” began, my local rag, the Philadelphia Inquirer, published an article examining the Phillies’ season to date and their road up ahead. It included a couple of graphics I wanted to share, because I found them a nice addition to the type of article usually devoid of such visual pieces.

The first piece looked at the Phillies’ performance relative to recent teams.

You can see the 2025 club is out performing the 2022 and 2023 editions of the team. I have a few critiques, but overall I enjoyed the graphic. I think the heavier stroke and the colour change for 2025 works…but are both necessary? Or at least to the extent the designer chose? And which line is which year?

The chart is too visually busy with too many bits and bobs clamouring for attention. The heaviness of the blue stroke works because the chart needs the loudness. But move the year labels to a consistent location—which, once established helps the user find similar information—and remove the data label annotations—the precise number of games over .500 should be clear through the axis labelling. If I make a couple quick edits in Photoshop to the image, you end up with something like this.

Again, an overall good graphic, but one with just a few tweaks to quiet the overall piece allows the user to more clearly identify the visual pattern—that the Phillies are good and better than two of their three most recent iterations.

The second piece was even better. It looked at the Phillies’ forthcoming opponents, which at the time of publication first included the Los Angeles Angels before the Sox. (For what it may be worth, the Angels won two of three.)

A different graphic, the same critique: overall good, but visually cluttered. Here I revisit the chart, but move some elements around to clear the chart’s visual space of clutter to emphasise the visual pattern in the chart.

I left the annotated point about the Phillies’ winning percentage, because I do think annotations work. But when a chart is full of annotations, the annotations become the story, not the graphic. And if that is the story, then a table or factettes become a better visual solution to the problem.

I will add I do not love how low the line for the opponents falls below the chart’s minimum axis. I probably would have extended the chart to something like .750 and .250, but it is far from the worst sin I see these days. (I keep thinking of writing something about the decline of the quality of data visualisation and information design in recent years, but that feels more akin to a polemical essay than a short blog post.)

Big takeaway, I like seeing my baseball articles with nice data visualisation. It heralds back to a couple of years ago when outlets routinely published such pieces. Baseball especially benefits from data visualisation because the game generates massive amounts of data both within each game and the collective 162-game season.

Good on the Inquirer for this article. I do not usually read the Sports section, because I am not a Philadelphia sports fan, but maybe I will read a bit more of the Phillies coverage if they include visual content like this.

Credit for the original pieces goes to Chris A. Williams. The edits are mine.

2025 Red Sox Draft Breakdown

Monday and Tuesday, Major League Baseball conducted its amateur player draft, wherein teams select American university and high school players. They have two weeks to sign them and assign them. (Though many will not actually play this year.)

Two years ago the Red Sox installed Craig Breslow as their new chief baseball organisation. He has cut a number of front office personnel and reorganised the Red Sox front office, leading to a number of departures. Crucially for this context, a number of the scouts who identified key Red Sox players like Roman Anthony were either let go or left. The team then focused on analysts and models.

My questions have thus been focused on how this might change the Red Sox’ approach to the draft. A running joke in Sox circles has been how every year the Red Sox draft a high school shortstop from California. But this year, the Red Sox’ first pick was Kyson Witherspoon, a starting pitcher from Oklahoma.

The graphic above shows how Witherspoon was ranked by the media who covers this niche area of baseball: a consensus top-10 pick. And yet the Sox selected Witherspoon at no. 15 overall. This has been another trend of the Sox over the last several years, where other teams select lower-ranked players and leave higher-ranked players available to the Sox and other mid-round selectors. Similarly, fourth-round pick Anthony Eyanson, ranked roughly 40–65, remained on the board and so the Sox took him at no. 87.

As someone who follows the Sox system, they need quality pitching prospects as they have very few of proven track records in the minors. Witherspoon and Eyanson provide them that, at least the quality, the track records have yet to develop. Marcus Phillips, seemingly, presents more of a lottery ticket. His ranking spread so far, from 13 to 98, it is clear there is no consensus on the type of talent the Sox took in him.

Godbout is a middle-infielder with a good hit tool, but light on the power. Clearly the Sox believe they can work with him to develop the power in the next few years. But all in all, three pitchers in the first four rounds.

Now, the additional context for the non-baseball fans amongst you who are still reading is this. Baseball’s draft does not work in the same way as those of, say the NFL or the NBA. One, the draft is much deeper at 20 rounds. (In my lifetime it used to be as deep as 50.) Two, teams (usually) do not draft for need. I.e., unlike the NFL where a team , say the Patriots, who needs a wide receiver might draft a wide receiver with their first pick, a team like the Red Sox who need, say, a catcher will not draft a catcher. A key reason why, it takes years for an MLB draftee to reach the majors if he does so at all. Whereas an NFL draftee likely plays for the Patriots the following year. In short, there is often a lag between the draft and the debut—unless you are the Los Angeles Angels. Thus you address your current positional needs via free agency or trades, not the draft. (Unless you are the Angels.) For the purposes of the draft, you therefore draft the “best player available” (BPA).

Some systems, however, are just better at doing different things. Some teams do a better job of developing pitchers, others of developing hitters. Some of developing certain traits of pitching or hitting. Some teams are just bad at it overall. The Sox have, of late, been very good at developing position players/hitters. They have been pretty not-so-great at developing pitching. Hence, when Breslow said he could improve their pitching pipeline, the Sox jumped at the chance to hire him. (It also helps everyone else they interviewed said no, and a number of candidates declined to even be interviewed.)

In part, the failure to develop pitching could be a failure to identify the correct player traits or characteristics. It could be the wrong methods and strategies, improper techniques and technologies. But, if we look at the recent history of Red Sox drafts, it could be, in part, also a consistent lack of drafting pitching. After all, the 26-man MLB team roster comprises 14 pitchers and 12 position players. (Technically it is a limit of 14 pitchers, but teams seem to generally max out their pitcher limit.)

You can see in my graphic above, since the late 2000s, the Red Sox, with few exceptions, ever drafted more than 50% pitchers. This period of time coincides with the ascendance of the vaunted Sox position player development factory and the decline of the homegrown starter. (Again, the obligatory reminder correlation is not causation.)

Nevertheless, in the last few years, we have seen the drafting of pitchers spike. In the first two years of the new Breslow regime, pitchers represent more than 70% of the amateur draft. (There is also the international signing period where players from around the world can be signed within limits. This is how the Sox have drafted very talented players like Rafael Devers and Xander Bogaerts. I omitted this talent acquisition channel from the graphics.)

Consequently, when a team states its strategy is to draft the BPA, but over 70% of all players selected are pitchers, I wonder how one defines “best”. Are the Red Sox weighing pitching more heavily than hitting? Is this an attempt to address a long-standing asymmetry in talent? In the models teams like the Red Sox use, are pitchers worth, say, 1.5× more than hitters? I doubt we will ever know the answer, though the team maintains they draft the best player available.

Ultimately, it may matter very little for the Red Sox in the near-term. The sport’s best prospect, Roman Anthony, is just starting to man the outfield for the Sox. A consensus top-10 prospect, Marcelo Mayer, has also just debuted. A top-25 prospect, Kristian Campbell, debuted on Opening Day. Two second-year players round out the outfield in Ceddanne Rafaela and Wilyer Abreu. A rookie catcher is behind the plate. The Sox may not need serious high-end positional player talent in the next 3–5 years. (Though it certainly helps when trying to trade for other pieces.)

But a two-year lull in drafting high-end positional player talent, on top of the previous two years’ first-round draft picks, catcher Kyle Teal and outfielder Braden Montgomery, being traded for ace Garrett Crochet, means the Sox may well have a several-year gap in positional player matriculation to the majors. That might matter.

Baseball, unlike the NFL and the NBA, is a marathon, however. So perhaps this is all a tempest in a teapot. Let us check back in five years’ time and we can see whether this new draft strategy, if it is indeed a strategy, has cost the Red Sox anything.

Credit for the pieces is mine.

When Is a Torpedo Is Not a Torpedo?

When it’s a torpedo bat.

Last week I looked at baseball’s new torpedo bats in a humourous light. But I did want to take a more serious look, because bat evolution has been part of the tale of baseball since its beginning. Back in the day bats featured long lengths and heavier weights. These days, bats are in the mid-30 inch length and mid-30 ounce weight. Current regulations limit bats to 42 inches in length and a maximum diameter of 2.61 inches. ¹ (There is some other stuff in there that is not terribly relevant to the torpedo bat.) And that’s it. Nothing about where the widest part of the bat need be nor the overall shape—merely a round, solid piece of wood.

The solid piece of wood is connected to corked bats. At my age I remember seeing the ESPN clips of Sammy Sosa’s corked bat in 2003 and the story of Albert Belle’s bat, stolen from the umpire’s room.

The torpedo bat, however, is not corked, instead it uses increased mass at the bat’s sweet spot, where it generates the greatest exit velocities when the batter hits the pitch. This graphic from ESPN shows how this works.

How a torpedo bat differs from the normal bat

Overall I like the graphic. The use of contrasting red and blue does a good job highlighting, particularly at the end where the normal bat continues with its edges running parallel as a regular cylinder. The torpedo bat changes into a cone with its top sliced off then rounded. I might have exaggerated the vertical dimensions of the bat illustration, but it still works.

Additionally, as I understand the design, it maximises the diameter of the bat to the aforementioned 2.61 inches. I have heard—but not confirmed—most bats do not reach the full diameter. If that is true, perhaps an illustration where the red lines fell below the maximum diameter of the torpedo bat could do a better job differentiating between the two shapes.

I prefer the above illustration to that produced by the Athletic/New York Times, which attempts a similar distinction.

I think ESPN’s overlay better shows the difference and that the Athletic’s wood pattern distracts from the graphic overall. Whereas ESPN uses the solid red vs. blue hatching to distinguish between the two shapes.

Of course that begets the question, why doesn’t every batter use the torpedo bat?

Suffice it to say, some players are better at hitting the ball consistently at the same spot on the bat. If a hitter can repeatedly make contact at a specific spot along the length of the bat, it makes sense to concentrate the mass of the bat at that spot for better hard contact. If, however, a hitter spreads his contact out along the length of the barrel, he probably wants a more evenly distributed mass to help create a better spread of good contact.

Regardless, as I wrote on Friday, the torpedo does not look like a torpedo. If anything, the normal baseball bat looks more like a torpedo than a torpedo bat.

Credit for the ESPN piece goes to ESPN’s graphics department.

Credit for the Athletic’s piece goes to Drew Jordan.

https://mktg.mlbstatic.com/mlb/official-information/2025-official-baseball-rules.pdf ↩︎

Damn the Torpedoes!

Baseball is back and so bring forth the controversies. One of the ones from last week? The torpedo bat. To be clear, the torpedo bat has been around for a few years—it’s not new. However, on Opening Weekend, the Yankees beat up on Milwaukee Brewers’ pitching. But a Yankees announcer specifically pointed out the design and the hype and the controversy was on.

But since this is a Friday, we’re going to look at a semi-humourous take from Davy Andrews of Fangraphs, a statistically-inclined baseball site. He uses illustrations to focus on the shape of the torpedo bat, which to my mind instantly did not look anything like a torpedo. (Read the full article for a funny aside about the shape’s resemblance—or lack thereof—to a torpedo.)

To be fair, I did not immediately think either old timey bomb or pregnant whale, but rather a bowling pin.

Credit for the piece goes to Davy Andrews.

The Red Sox May Finally Have a Second Baseman

Last week was baseball’s opening day. And so on the socials I released my predictions for the season and then a look at the revolving door that has been the Red Sox and second base since 2017.

Back in 2017 we were in the 11th year of Dustin Pedroia being the Sox’ star second baseman. That summer, Manny Machado slid spikes up into second and ruined Pedroia’s knee. Pedroia had surgery and missed Opening Day 2018 then struggled to return. He played 105 games in 2017 then only three in 2018 and then six in 2019. And thus began the instability. Here’s a list of the Opening Day second baseman since 2017.

2018 Eduardo Nuñez
2019 Eduardo Nuñez
2020 José Peraza
2021 Kiké Hernández
2022 Trevor Story
2023 Christian Arroyo
2024 Enmanuel Valdez
2025 Kristian Campbell

And, again, by comparison…

2007 Dustin Pedroia
2008 Dustin Pedroia
2009 Dustin Pedroia
2010 Dustin Pedroia
2011 Dustin Pedroia
2012 Dustin Pedroia
2013 Dustin Pedroia
2014 Dustin Pedroia
2015 Dustin Pedroia
2016 Dustin Pedroia
2017 Dustin Pedroia

But not only is it a lack of stability, it is a lack of production. Wins Above Replacement (WAR) is a statistic that attempts to capture a player’s value relative to an “average” player or substitute. A below replacement level person is less than 0 WAR. A substitute is 0–2, a regular everyday players is 2–5, an All Star is 5–8, and an elite MVP level performance is 8+ WAR. And, spoiler, the Sox have not had a 5+ WAR second baseman since Pedroia’s final full season in 2016.

Suffice it to say, the Sox have long had a need for a long-term second baseman. The graphics I created were meant to be two Instagram images in the same post, and so the the axis labels and lines stretch across the artboards.

The graphic shows pretty clearly the turmoil at the keystone. The two outliers are Kiké Hernández in 2021 and Trevor Story in 2022. The latter is easily explained. Story was signed to be the backup plan in case shortstop Xander Bogaerts left after 2022. (Back in 2013 I made a graphic after a similar revolving door of shortstops in the eight years after the Red Sox traded Nomar Garciaparra. Then the question was, would a young rookie named Xander Bogaerts be the replacement for the beloved Nomah. Xander played 10 years for the Sox.)

Kiké, however, is a bit trickier to explain. WAR weights value by position. A second baseman is worth more than a leftfielder. But shortstops and centrefielders are worth more than second baseman. And Kiké played a lot more shortstop and centre than he did second base, which likely explains his 4.9 WAR that season.

And so now in 2025 we had yet another guy starting at second. His name? Kristian Campbell. I saw him a few times last year as he rocketed from A to AAA, the lowest to highest levels of minor league player development below the major league. I thought he looked good and so did the professionals, because he’s a consensus top-10 prospect in the sport.

Going into Monday’s matchup between Boston and Baltimore, Campbell is hitting 6 for 14 with one homer and two doubles, an on-base percentage of .500 and an OPS (on-base plus slugging, which weights extra base hits more heavily than singles) of 1.286. Spoiler: that’s very good.

Boston beat writers are reporting the Sox and Campbell’s agent are in talks for a long-term extension.

It looks like the Sox may have found their new long-term second baseman.

Credit for the piece is mine.

Predicting…the Known Stats?

I have been trying to post more regularly here on Coffeespoons, but now that baseball’s postseason is in full swing—pun fully intended—my free time is spent watching balls and strikes at all hours of the day. (Though, with the Wild Card round over and the move from four to two games per day, my time will likely expand as the week winds down. Sort of. More on that in a moment.)

What I have noticed on a few broadcasts, however, is the broadcast team touting Google’s ability to forecast a player’s ability to get on base. Most recently, on Sunday afternoon my mates and I were watching the Phillies–Mets contest and the broadcaster announced or the graphic popped on screen claiming Google predicts Francisco Lindor has a 34% chance to get on base in the plate appearance.

That can be a useful nugget of knowledge. And wow, that is crazy that Google can predict Lindor’s chances of getting on base.

Except it is not.

Francisco Lindor’s on base percentage (OBP) for the 2024 season was 0.344. In other words, in 34.4% of plate appearances (PAs), Lindor either gets a hit or takes a walk. With a entire sample of 689 PAs, Lindor got on base 34% of the time. Maybe Google was taking into account some other factors, but that was just the most recent one I can recall.

I wish I could recall which batter first keyed me into this situation. I want to say it was a high OBP guy, and for whatever reason I pulled my mobile out and opened the batter’s page on Baseball Reference only to find the prediction matched the OBP exactly.

Then it happened again. And again. And again.

Baseball is the greatest sport. One reason I love it is because you can use data and information to describe it. Plan for it. Play it. And sometimes predict it. Sometimes that works. Sometimes, when it doesn’t, it breaks your heart.

Baseball has reams of data and, yes, that data can feed into newer and cooler algorithms and models for predicting outcomes. (Outcomes that surely have nothing to do with the flood of sports gambling available on mobile phones.) But to me, it seems a bit disingenuous to call a statistic that has largely moved out of the realm of baseball nerds into the common understanding of the sport—thanks, Moneyball—a company’s new predictive statistic when that statistic has existed forever.

Separately, as I alluded to earlier, I shall not be posting the next few weeks. I have a weekday wedding to attend later in the week and then I am headed out of town for a few weeks and intend to be doing very little digital stuff. Plus, by the time I return baseball’s postseason shall likely be over.

But in the meantime, I am going to be heading out this afternoon to meet some mates as they cheer on their local squad, the Philadelphia Phillies as they play the Mets. (No, the Red Sox did not, yet again, make the postseason.)

As the first batter, Kyle Schwarber, steps to the plate, I predict he will have a 37% chance of getting on base. And look, his OBP is 0.366.

Tired of These Motherfcking Sox on This Motherfcking Plane

At least, that’s what I imagine South Siders saying in Chicago as they watch the White Sox team charter plane land at Midway. For those not following America’s Major League Baseball season, the Chicago White Sox are one of two clubs claiming Chicago as their home. (The other being the Cubs.) And the White Sox—not to be confused with your author’s favourite club, the Red Sox—are on track to be one of the worst clubs in the modern (post-1900) history of the sport. They have already tied the New York Mets’ record of 120 losses and there are still six left to play.

Earlier this month the Athletic detailed what has gone wrong for the Pale Hose. One of the things that stood out to me the most in the reporting was the complaints about the club’s charter aircraft, an Airbus A320, as the article points out a 1980s aircraft. The article in particular mentioned how other cheapskate teams—including the Boston Red Sox—opt for nicer aircraft with more first-class accommodations for players and staff. Then they cited a graphic shared on Twitter last year by Jay Cuda and when I saw that, I knew I had to cover it.

One thing I find fascinating is how the White Sox use United Airlines for their charter. United Airlines operates the charter—as it does for the Cubs and other airlines. That it does so for the two Chicago teams makes all the sense in the world as the company is headquartered in the Loop in downtown Chicago. It is also one of the largest airlines and thus makes sense in that dimension too.

But as those frequent air travellers among you will know, Chicago has two airports: O’Hare and Midway. O’Hare in northwest of downtown and closer to the Cubs and is the city’s primary airport. But the White Sox typically fly out of Midway, which is just a couple miles from (New) Comiskey. (I presume the team bus hops on the Dan Ryan/I-90 to the Stevenson/I-55 then exits on Cicero.)

Weird because United does not service Midway. And so United, which operates out of O’Hare, must fly aircraft to Midway to then transport the White Sox. I suppose the White Sox would not want to charter a Southwest aircraft, though…. In my own lifetime I think I have flown in and out of Midway only twice. And I lived in Chicago for eight years. (And the White Sox were terrible for probably six of them.)

Some non-White Sox things notable from the graphic. One, iAero no longer exists, so I would be curious whom the Texas Rangers and Oakland Athletics used this year. The Rangers probably used a reputable airline. The Athletics probably made their players and staff charter their own transport.

I also did not realise that even last year the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 still carried passengers in the United States. I assume that by 2024, the Detroit Tigers have fully transitioned to that Boeing 737. I find it fascinating that only the Tigers own their own aircraft. I would be curious to know why more teams do not, though of course it has to be money.

With whom else would the Blue Jays fly but Air Canada?

Finally, I am surprised that my Boston Red Sox use Delta, because that’s a normal, non-budget airline. And anyone who follows the Red Sox know the Red Sox are no longer in the habit of spending money. I thought they would use jetBlue, which is the sponsor for Fenway South, formally jetBluePark, in Fort Myers, Florida, where the Red Sox have their spring training and development league complex.

Anyways, happy Friday, all. At least you don’t play or work for the Chicago White Sox. (Though I suppose it is possible you do, because I do have a large number of readers from Chicago. But I doubt it.)

Credit for the piece goes to Jay Cuda.

I Want a Pitcher Not a Back o’ Head Hitter

We’re about to go into the sportsball realm, readers. Baseball, specifically.

Tuesday night, Atlanta Braves batter Whit Merrifield was hit in the back of the head by a 95 mph fastball. Luckily, modern ballplayers wear helmets. But at that velocity, one does not have the most reaction time in the world a number of other batters have been hit in the face. And generally, that’s not good. Merrifield went off in post-game interviews about the lack of accountability on the pitchers’ side. From my perspective as an armchair ballplayer, back in my day, when I walked up hill through the snow both ways to get to my one-room schoolhouse, if you hit a batter, our pitcher was hitting one of yours.

I have noticed in ballgames, however, I see hit-by-pitch (HBP) more often—and I score most ballgames I attend, so I have records. But I also know a handful attended per year makes for a very small sample size. Nonetheless, I know I have talked to other baseball friends and brought up that I think pitchers throw with less command, i.e. throwing strikes, than they used to, because I see more HBP in the box scores. And when I go to minor league ballgames, which I do fairly often, HBP seems on the rise there, which means in future years those same pitchers will likely be in the majors.

So yesterday morning, I finally took a look at the data and, lo and behold, indeed, since my childhood, the numbers of HBPs has increased.

There is one noticeable sharp dip and that is the 2020 COVID-shortened season. Ignore that one. And then a smaller dip in the mid-90s represents the 114-game and 144-game seasons, compared to the standard 162 per year. Nonetheless, the increase is undeniable.

There is a general dip in the curve, which occurs in the late 200s and early 2010s, with its nadir in 2012. Without doing more research, that was probably the peak of pitchers, who could command—throw strikes—and control—put their strikes where they want in the strike zone—their pitches at the sacrifice of velocity.

2014 saw the rise of the dominant Royals bullpen, which changed the course of modern baseball. Stack your bullpen with a number of power arms who throw 100 mph and just challenge batters to hit the speedball. Problem is, not everyone who can throw 100 knows where that speedball is going. And that leads to more batters being hit.

Merrifield is correct in his assessment that until pitchers and teams face consequences for hitting batters, we are not likely to see a decrease in HBPs. Or at least not until velocity is de-emphasised for some other reason. What if there were a rule a pitcher who hits a batter from the shoulder up is immediately ejected? What if a long-term injury for a batter is tied to a long-term roster removal for the pitcher? If, say, the batter hit in the head is out for a month with a concussion, the same pitcher is on the restricted list for a month?

Have I worked through any of these ideas in depth? Nope. Just spitballing here on ye olde blog. But as my chart shows, it does not look like this potentially life-changing problem in the game is going away anytime soon.

Credit for the piece is mine.