Monday and Tuesday, Major League Baseball conducted its amateur player draft, wherein teams select American university and high school players. They have two weeks to sign them and assign them. (Though many will not actually play this year.)
Two years ago the Red Sox installed Craig Breslow as their new chief baseball organisation. He has cut a number of front office personnel and reorganised the Red Sox front office, leading to a number of departures. Crucially for this context, a number of the scouts who identified key Red Sox players like Roman Anthony were either let go or left. The team then focused on analysts and models.
My questions have thus been focused on how this might change the Red Sox’ approach to the draft. A running joke in Sox circles has been how every year the Red Sox draft a high school shortstop from California. But this year, the Red Sox’ first pick was Kyson Witherspoon, a starting pitcher from Oklahoma.

The graphic above shows how Witherspoon was ranked by the media who covers this niche area of baseball: a consensus top-10 pick. And yet the Sox selected Witherspoon at no. 15 overall. This has been another trend of the Sox over the last several years, where other teams select lower-ranked players and leave higher-ranked players available to the Sox and other mid-round selectors. Similarly, fourth-round pick Anthony Eyanson, ranked roughly 40–65, remained on the board and so the Sox took him at no. 87.
As someone who follows the Sox system, they need quality pitching prospects as they have very few of proven track records in the minors. Witherspoon and Eyanson provide them that, at least the quality, the track records have yet to develop. Marcus Phillips, seemingly, presents more of a lottery ticket. His ranking spread so far, from 13 to 98, it is clear there is no consensus on the type of talent the Sox took in him.
Godbout is a middle-infielder with a good hit tool, but light on the power. Clearly the Sox believe they can work with him to develop the power in the next few years. But all in all, three pitchers in the first four rounds.
Now, the additional context for the non-baseball fans amongst you who are still reading is this. Baseball’s draft does not work in the same way as those of, say the NFL or the NBA. One, the draft is much deeper at 20 rounds. (In my lifetime it used to be as deep as 50.) Two, teams (usually) do not draft for need. I.e., unlike the NFL where a team , say the Patriots, who needs a wide receiver might draft a wide receiver with their first pick, a team like the Red Sox who need, say, a catcher will not draft a catcher. A key reason why, it takes years for an MLB draftee to reach the majors if he does so at all. Whereas an NFL draftee likely plays for the Patriots the following year. In short, there is often a lag between the draft and the debut—unless you are the Los Angeles Angels. Thus you address your current positional needs via free agency or trades, not the draft. (Unless you are the Angels.) For the purposes of the draft, you therefore draft the “best player available” (BPA).
Some systems, however, are just better at doing different things. Some teams do a better job of developing pitchers, others of developing hitters. Some of developing certain traits of pitching or hitting. Some teams are just bad at it overall. The Sox have, of late, been very good at developing position players/hitters. They have been pretty not-so-great at developing pitching. Hence, when Breslow said he could improve their pitching pipeline, the Sox jumped at the chance to hire him. (It also helps everyone else they interviewed said no, and a number of candidates declined to even be interviewed.)
In part, the failure to develop pitching could be a failure to identify the correct player traits or characteristics. It could be the wrong methods and strategies, improper techniques and technologies. But, if we look at the recent history of Red Sox drafts, it could be, in part, also a consistent lack of drafting pitching. After all, the 26-man MLB team roster comprises 14 pitchers and 12 position players. (Technically it is a limit of 14 pitchers, but teams seem to generally max out their pitcher limit.)

You can see in my graphic above, since the late 2000s, the Red Sox, with few exceptions, ever drafted more than 50% pitchers. This period of time coincides with the ascendance of the vaunted Sox position player development factory and the decline of the homegrown starter. (Again, the obligatory reminder correlation is not causation.)
Nevertheless, in the last few years, we have seen the drafting of pitchers spike. In the first two years of the new Breslow regime, pitchers represent more than 70% of the amateur draft. (There is also the international signing period where players from around the world can be signed within limits. This is how the Sox have drafted very talented players like Rafael Devers and Xander Bogaerts. I omitted this talent acquisition channel from the graphics.)
Consequently, when a team states its strategy is to draft the BPA, but over 70% of all players selected are pitchers, I wonder how one defines “best”. Are the Red Sox weighing pitching more heavily than hitting? Is this an attempt to address a long-standing asymmetry in talent? In the models teams like the Red Sox use, are pitchers worth, say, 1.5× more than hitters? I doubt we will ever know the answer, though the team maintains they draft the best player available.
Ultimately, it may matter very little for the Red Sox in the near-term. The sport’s best prospect, Roman Anthony, is just starting to man the outfield for the Sox. A consensus top-10 prospect, Marcelo Mayer, has also just debuted. A top-25 prospect, Kristian Campbell, debuted on Opening Day. Two second-year players round out the outfield in Ceddanne Rafaela and Wilyer Abreu. A rookie catcher is behind the plate. The Sox may not need serious high-end positional player talent in the next 3–5 years. (Though it certainly helps when trying to trade for other pieces.)
But a two-year lull in drafting high-end positional player talent, on top of the previous two years’ first-round draft picks, catcher Kyle Teal and outfielder Braden Montgomery, being traded for ace Garrett Crochet, means the Sox may well have a several-year gap in positional player matriculation to the majors. That might matter.
Baseball, unlike the NFL and the NBA, is a marathon, however. So perhaps this is all a tempest in a teapot. Let us check back in five years’ time and we can see whether this new draft strategy, if it is indeed a strategy, has cost the Red Sox anything.
Credit for the pieces is mine.